Competition law in China

November 2016
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1. Introduction

1.1 The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has a comprehensive system of competition law, largely under its Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) which came into effect on 1 August 2008. It applies throughout the PRC with the exception of the two Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau.\(^1\)

1.2 The AML prohibits monopolistic conduct, which can be divided into the following broad headings:\(^2\)

- Anti-competitive ("monopoly") agreements between undertakings;
- Abuse of a dominant position; and
- Mergers that may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition.

1.3 In addition to the AML itself, implementing rules and guidelines play a crucial role in the application of the AML. However, limited guidance is available and there remain areas of uncertainty over the application of the AML. Reliance is placed on the practice of the authorities, which may change from time to time.

1.4 Whilst merger control was the initial focus in the PRC, recent years have seen a rapid increase in investigations for anti-competitive behaviour by the relevant authorities, as well as private actions being brought before the courts. Although the staffing of the PRC competition agencies remains limited, the increase in the number of investigations recently reflects a more proactive attitude towards enforcement.

1.5 In addition to merger review, transactions in certain sectors may be subject to a separate national security review process for the acquisition of domestic PRC companies by foreign investors (pursuant to Article 31 AML) (see Chapter 8).

1.6 Although outside the scope of this publication, it is worth noting that the PRC has a separate Anti-Unfair Competition Law and Price Law, which may overlap to some extent with the AML, for example in ensuring that a business operator shall not, for the purposes of driving out competitors, sell their goods or services below cost. In addition, the PRC State Council published in June 2016 its opinion on establishing a nationwide Fair Competition Review System, which is intended to curb anti-competitive behaviour of government agencies. As a matter of policy, this new Fair Competition Review is an active step by the PRC Government to create a unified national market and a level playing field for businesses, with the aim of allowing the market - rather than Government policies - to determine resource allocation. In this regard, the Fair Competition Review has some parallels to the free movement provisions and State aid rules of the European Union.

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\(^1\) The Hong Kong Competition Ordinance came into full effect on 14 December 2015. More information can be found in the Annex to this publication.

\(^2\) In addition, the AML also prohibits the abuse of administrative powers to restrict competition.
2. Enforcement structure

2.1 The AML introduced two new regulatory agencies:

- the Anti-Monopoly Committee under the State Council, which is responsible for developing competition policy, conducting market investigations, publishing guidelines and coordinating the competition administrative enforcement work;¹ and

- the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authority (AMEA) designated by the State Council, which is responsible for the enforcement of the AML.⁴

2.2 As shown in Figure 1 below, the enforcement powers of the AMEA are divided between three different agencies.

Figure 1: The enforcement agencies of the AML

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agency (AMEA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enforces the price related rules of the AML (including anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3 Each of the three different agencies at the central State level has corresponding local bodies that operate at or below the provincial level nationwide.

2.4 The AML and implementing rules are silent on which agency would have jurisdiction where there is a combination of price and non-price related elements that are significant within a single case, although in practice the allocation of the various powers has not proved to be a problem to date.

¹ Art.9, AML.
² Art.10, AML.
3. **Implementing rules**

3.1 The vast majority of the secondary legislation to date has been in relation to merger control, including guidance and rules on the documents required for merger notifications, conduct of merger reviews, market definition, the filing and review of merger notifications, substantive assessment and divestiture remedies. MOFCOM has provided some clarification on certain key issues, such as the circumstances that constitute the acquisition of “control” and the treatment of joint ventures under the AML. Whilst some uncertainties remain in the guidance and rules, MOFCOM has developed its own practice in the years since the AML came into effect. Notably, in contrast to the EU regime, there is no distinction (comparable to that made in the EU Merger Regulation) between full function and non-full function joint ventures and MOFCOM takes a somewhat broader approach than the European Commission to the definition of “joint control” (as demonstrated by MOFCOM’s prohibition decision of the P3 alliance in June 2014).

3.2 As a result of the allocation of enforcement powers between the NDRC and SAIC (for price related and non-price related matters respectively), there is considerable overlap between these rules, however they are not entirely consistent. For example, leniency is covered in both sets of rules enforced by the agencies respectively. The NDRC has specified that the first undertaking to proactively report a monopoly agreement and provide significant evidence to the relevant authority may obtain a 100 per cent reduction from the fine; the second undertaking to do so may receive a reduction of not less than 50 per cent; and subsequent undertakings may receive a reduction of not more than 50 per cent. The SAIC, however, has not specified the extent of the reduction for undertakings other than full immunity for the first in line (see Chapter 4 below).
4. Anti-competitive (“monopoly”) agreements

4.1 Anti-competitive agreements are referred to in the AML as “monopoly agreements”. The basic principles in this area are comparable to Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

Prohibition

4.2 Monopoly agreements are defined in Article 13 AML as agreements, decisions or other concerted behaviour that eliminate or restrict competition. Articles 13 and 14 provide a list of monopoly agreements between competing undertakings that are automatically presumed to be illegal, such as price-fixing agreements or arrangements limiting production or sales volumes, dividing sales or procurement markets, restricting the purchase of new technology or new products, or involving resale price maintenance.

Exemption

4.3 As with the EU and US regimes, exemption from the prohibition is available in certain circumstances. Article 15 AML allows undertakings to rebut the anti-competitive presumption. In order to benefit from the exemption, the undertakings must show all of the following:

- the agreement(s) in fact had a qualifying purpose, such as to upgrade technology, research and development, improve product quality, reduce cost, improve efficiency, enhance the competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises, maintain public welfare, or be for the purposes of international trade and foreign economic cooperation;

- the agreement(s) will not substantially restrict competition in the relevant market; and

- consumers will receive a fair share of the resulting benefits.

Enforcement action

4.4 Initially, most enforcement action was carried out at a local level. The SAIC and NDRC have delegated their enforcement powers to their local departments (the local AIC and the local price authority respectively) to carry out investigations of anti-competitive conduct. These investigations are often concluded with the relevant undertaking offering to take corrective measures (without the imposition of a fine), and may not even be reported by the press.

4.5 However, over the past few years, there have been a number of high profile investigations on a national level, focusing on cartels and resale price maintenance. Local departments are also beginning to impose larger fines. Table 1 below summarises some of the key cases to date.
Table 1: Key investigations into monopoly agreements to date

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case description</th>
<th>Fines imposed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LCD panel case involving price fixing by six foreign LCD panel manufacturers in January 2013</td>
<td>Fines totalling RMB 353 million and a number of behavioural commitments were imposed, with Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd and LG Display Co., Ltd receiving the highest fines of RMB 101 million and RMB 118 million respectively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquor case involving resale price maintenance by Kweichow Moutai Co., Ltd and Wuliangye Yibin Co., Ltd, two state-owned producers of premium liquor in February 2013</td>
<td>Fines of RMB 247 million and RMB 202 million were imposed on Kweichow and Wuliangye respectively, with a combined total of RMB 449 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant milk powder case involving resale price maintenance by nine international infant formula manufacturers in August 2013</td>
<td>Fines totalling RMB 669 million were imposed on six companies by the NDRC; three companies were granted immunity from fines - see more on leniency below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai gold cartel case involving price manipulation by five Shanghai-based gold and jewellery retailers and a local trade association in August 2013</td>
<td>Combined fines of RMB 10 million were imposed on the retailers, representing 1 per cent of their 2012 revenues; a fine of RMB 500,000 was imposed on the trade association for its leading role in creating the pricing scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular, excessive charges or charges without providing service involving 64 bank branches across the PRC in February 2014</td>
<td>Fines totalling RMB 825 million were imposed on 64 bank branches by the NDRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price-fixing of car parts case involving eight Japanese car parts makers and price-fixing of bearings case involving four Japanese bearings suppliers in August 2014</td>
<td>Fines totalling RMB 832 million were imposed on seven of the eight car parts makers and fines totalling RMB 403 million were imposed on three of the four bearings suppliers, resulting in a combined total fine of RMB 1.2 billion. Hitachi, Ltd and Nachi-Fujikoshi Corp. were exempted from fines for being the first car parts maker and bearings supplier respectively to report the conduct to the NDRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resale price maintenance in relation to certain car models and auto components by Mercedes-Benz (China) Ltd and certain dealers in April 2015</td>
<td>A fine of RMB 350 million was imposed by the Jiangsu Price Bureau on Mercedes-Benz, representing 7 per cent of its 2014 revenues; Mercedes-Benz dealers involved in the resale price maintenance agreements were also fined a total of RMB 7.9 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bid-rigging involving eight shipping companies in December 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market allocation and price-fixing case involving five PRC pharmaceutical companies in January 2016 (including Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price-fixing case involving 31 suppliers of vehicle inspection services and an industry association in April 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refusal to supply and price-fixing in relation to estazolam ingredients involving three pharmaceutical companies in July 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resale price maintenance case involving three dealers of Haier household appliances in August 2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fines imposed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fines totalling RMB 407 million were imposed by the NDRC on the eight companies ranging from 4 to 9 per cent of each company’s annual sales in the PRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fines totalling RMB 4 million were imposed by the NDRC on the five pharmaceutical companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fines totalling RMB 5.8 million were imposed by the Shaanxi Price Bureau on the 31 vehicle inspection service providers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fines totalling RMB 2.6 million were imposed by the Jiangsu Price Bureau on the three pharmaceutical companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fines totalling RMB 12.3 million were imposed by the Shanghai Price Bureau on the three household appliance dealers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Leniency

4.6 As indicated above, leniency is available under the AML. Since September 2014, when the NDRC started to publish its penalty decisions, there has been more clarity on its calculation of fines and use of leniency in cartel cases. The published cases show that the NDRC tends to grant full immunity from fines to the first undertaking that self-reports and impose fines of a varying extent (between 4 to 8 per cent) according to the order of self-reporting.

4.7 We understand that leniency was applied in the LCD panel case. Reportedly, AU Optronics Corp. was exempted from administrative fines (which, for the other LCD makers, ranged from 50 per cent to 200 per cent of their illegal gains) because it was the first participant to confess to the NDRC. We note, however, that this case was decided under the Price Law and not the AML as the illegal behaviour occurred between 2001 and 2006, before the AML came into effect. Unlike the AML, the Price Law does not contain specific provisions on leniency but gives the NDRC discretion to take into account confessions and cooperative behaviour in deciding the administrative fine payable.

4.8 More recently, leniency was applied in the Japanese car parts and bearings cases. According to the published decisions, Hitachi and Nachi were fully exempted from penalties for being the first in line to confess to the NDRC and provide important evidence. Denso Corporation and NSK Ltd., being second in line, were fined 4 per cent of their respective 2013 revenues in the PRC. Yazaki Corporation, Furukawa Co., Ltd., Sumitomo Corporation and NTN Corporation were fined 6 per cent of their 2013 revenues in the PRC, taking into account mitigating circumstances. Aisan Industry Co., Ltd., Mitsubishi Electric Corporation and Mitsuba Corporation were fined 8 per cent of their 2013 revenues in the PRC.
revenues in the PRC for reaching price-fixing agreements in relation to more than two products. JTEKT Corporation was also fined 8 per cent for suggesting price-fixing meetings specifically targeting the PRC market. Fines of 8 per cent of revenue mark the highest level of penalty imposed by the NDRC to date.

4.9 This case sheds more light on the NDRC’s investigation methods, use of leniency procedure and calculation of fines. Mitigating circumstances which the NDRC has taken into account include confession, cooperation and voluntary termination of anti-competitive conduct.

4.10 The NDRC published its draft leniency guidelines for horizontal monopoly agreements in February 2016. The draft guidelines set out, among other things, the requirements that leniency applicants should satisfy in order to qualify for leniency, and explain in detail the procedure for applying for leniency, the queuing system and the reduction in fines that each leniency applicant would receive according to their position in the leniency queue. Similar guidelines from the SAIC are expected to be drafted. Comments from the SAIC indicate that it intends to include additional procedural rules on leniency applications, among other changes.

4.11 In addition, the NDRC published its draft guidelines on identifying illegal income generated from monopolistic practices and determining penalties in June 2016. The draft guidelines indicate that, in general, the relevant sales to be considered for the purpose of determining penalties under the AML are those generated by sales (i) of the relevant products and (ii) within the PRC market. This is consistent with the general decisional practice in the NDRC’s cases to date. However, the NDRC has left open the option of taking up to an undertaking’s total worldwide sales as the starting point if the sales of relevant products within the PRC market do not result in a penalty that is commensurate with the violation with sufficient deterrent effect.
5. **Abuse of a dominant position**

5.1 The basic AML principles on abuse of dominance are comparable to Article 102 TFEU.

**Dominant position defined**

5.2 A dominant market position is defined in Article 17 AML and clarified to some extent by the implementing rules. It refers to a market position held by one or more undertaking(s) that enables it/them to:

- control the price, volume or other trading terms in the relevant market. “Other trading terms” refers to factors which can have a material impact on market purchases, including product grade, payment terms, method of delivery, after-sales services, trading options, technical constraints etc.; or

- block or affect the ability of another undertaking to enter the relevant market, for example by delaying another undertaking’s entry into the market or increasing its entry cost so that it cannot compete effectively.

5.3 The dominance assessment will depend on a number of factors, including the relevant undertaking’s market shares and the competitiveness of the relevant market, the ability of the undertaking to control the sales or input market, the financial strength and technical resources of the undertaking, the extent to which other undertakings rely on the relevant undertaking and the ease of market entry.³

**Market share presumption**

5.4 Unlike Article 102 TFEU, the text of the AML specifies in Article 19 certain market share thresholds which give rise to a presumption of dominance, as set out in Table 2 below.

**Table 2: Market share thresholds in Article 19 AML for the presumption of dominance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of undertakings</th>
<th>Combined share of the relevant market to create a presumption of dominance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Half</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Two-thirds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Three-quarters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.5 Presumptions of a dominant position can be rebutted by evidence to the contrary.⁶

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³ Art.10, SAIC Rules on Abuse of Dominance; Art.18, NDRC Rules on Anti-Price Monopoly Conduct.
⁶ Art.19, AML.
5.6 Furthermore, an exception is available where the presumption of dominance is created on the basis of the combined market share of two or more undertakings: if any such undertaking has a market share of less than 10 per cent, it will not be presumed to have a dominant position.

5.7 The decision by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) in *Qihoo v Tencent* demonstrates that it is possible to rebut the above presumptions of dominance. Tencent Inc. was held not to have a dominant position despite having a market share exceeding 80 per cent in the instant messaging (IM) service market. In reaching this conclusion, the SPC considered factors such as the rapidly developing and constantly changing competitive landscape of the IM service market in the PRC, Tencent’s inability to control price, quantity or other trading terms in that market, the existence of credible competitors who can affect Tencent’s leading position, and evidence of low barriers to entry. The SPC was therefore willing to look beyond Tencent’s high market share and rebut the presumption based on evidence of Tencent’s market power and the dynamics of the IM service market.

5.8 Strict reliance on market shares in creating a presumption of collective dominance is unusual. For example, US antitrust laws do not recognise the concept of collective dominance at all. As regards the position in the EU, complex evidence is required to prove collective dominance under Article 102 TFEU, including evidence that the undertakings are linked economically (such as through contractual agreements or structural market factors). There is, however, no mention of similar requirements in either the AML or the relevant implementing rules. The authorities may find it impractical to adhere too strictly to these market share tests for collective dominance.

### Abuse

5.9 Article 17 AML and the implementing rules set out a non-exhaustive list of the types of behaviour that, without justification, would be considered abusive and therefore prohibited. These can be split broadly into:

- **Exploitative abuses**: the dominant company abuses its position by exploiting its customers or suppliers, for example, by selling at unfairly high prices or buying at unfairly low prices; and

- **Exclusionary abuses**: the dominant company abuses its position by excluding its competitors, for example by selling below cost, refusing to trade (including, without objective reasons, reducing existing transaction volumes, delaying or suspending an existing transaction, imposing prohibitively restrictive conditions, denying access to essential facilities), requiring exclusivity, implementing tie-in sales or imposing other discriminatory or unreasonable trading terms.

### Noteworthy cases

- **Qualcomm**: In February 2015 the NDRC imposed a fine of RMB 6.1 billion on Qualcomm Incorporated, a technology company, for charging Chinese companies excessive royalty fees, as well as for other practices such as bundling and requiring licensees to cross-license their patents for free, after 15 months of investigation. The fine represented 8 per cent of Qualcomm’s 2013 revenue in the PRC.

- **Tetra Pak**: On 16 November 2016 the SAIC imposed on Tetra Pak, a Swedish food processing and packaging solutions company, penalties totalling RMB 668 million for abuse of dominance, representing 7% of its turnover in the relevant aseptic packaging markets in China. The SAIC found that Tetra Pak tied the sale of its raw materials to its equipment, imposed exclusivity restrictions and offered targeted loyalty discounts and rebates to customers. This represents the
largest fine the SAIC has imposed since the AML came into effect in 2008 and marks the end of an investigation that has lasted over four years.

- **Microsoft**: In July 2014 the SAIC conducted dawn raids at Microsoft Corporation’s offices in the PRC as part of an investigation into Microsoft’s alleged abuse of dominant position through imposing compatibility restrictions on its Windows operating system and software and tying arrangements. The investigation is currently ongoing.

- **Shuntong / Huaxin**: In November 2011 two pharmaceutical companies, Shandong Weifang Shuntong Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. and Weifang Huaxin Medicine Trading Co. Ltd., were fined a total of RMB 6.9 million by the NDRC for unlawfully controlling the supply of promethazine hydrochloride in the PRC by entering into exclusive sales agreements with the only two manufacturers of the ingredient and subsequently driving up prices.

- **China Unicom / China Telecom**: On 9 November 2011 the NDRC initiated an investigation into China Unicom (Hong Kong) Limited and China Telecom Corporation Limited over alleged monopolistic price discrimination in the market for broadband Internet service. This was the first time in which a regulator has targeted large state-owned enterprises in relation to antitrust enforcement in the PRC. China Unicom and China Telecom undertook to lower prices and applied for adjournment of the investigation on 2 December 2011. Both companies also submitted improvement reports to the NDRC in February 2012. No fine has been imposed so far. However, the NDRC urged China Unicom and China Telecom to carry out rectification of their monopolistic behaviour which could take up to three to five years to complete.

- **Unilever**: In May 2011 Unilever was fined RMB 2 million by the NDRC after the company announced that it planned to raise the prices of certain personal care products. The NDRC imposed the fine under the Price Law, but suggested that it may have involved a potential price-fixing cartel as several major personal care producers indicated their intentions to increase prices following Unilever’s warning.

### Intellectual property rights

5.10 The interplay between competition law and protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) has, in recent years, been a focus of enforcement activity in many jurisdictions globally, including in the PRC. Remarkably, given that the AML has only been in force for eight years, both the courts and the regulators have demonstrated a willingness to engage with difficult issues regarding IPRs in complex and high-profile cases such as *Huawei v InterDigital* and the NDRC’s investigations into the licensing practices of InterDigital, Inc. and Qualcomm.

5.11 In *Huawei v InterDigital* the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court found that InterDigital had:

- abused its dominant position by: (a) making proposals for excessive royalties; (b) tying its standard-essential patents (SEPs) with non-SEPs during licensing negotiations; (c) insisting on Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.’s cross-licensing of all its own patents on a royalty-free basis; and (d) seeking injunctive relief before the US District Court for the District of Delaware and before the US International Trade Commission while still in negotiations with Huawei to force it to accept unreasonable licensing terms, including excessive royalties; and
• failed to comply with fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) commitments by commencing injunction proceedings and requiring Huawei to pay significantly higher royalties (in some instances, 100 times higher) than those paid by Apple and Samsung despite Huawei’s lower global sales.

5.12 The Shenzhen Court became the first court to determine a FRAND royalty rate. The Shenzhen Court’s decision was subsequently affirmed on appeal by a higher court although a petition for leave to appeal has since been submitted to the SPC with respect to the calculation of the royalty rate. If allowed, a SPC decision on this issue could provide clarity on the approach to be followed by Chinese courts when determining a FRAND royalty rate.

5.13 Separately, the NDRC has investigated both Qualcomm and InterDigital for charging PRC companies excessive royalty fees, as well as for other practices such as bundling and requiring licensees to cross-license their patents for free. InterDigital agreed to abide by certain commitments and Qualcomm was fined RMB 6.1 billion. The SAIC, on the other hand, is continuing its abuse of dominance investigation into Microsoft regarding interoperability and other competition concerns related to the Windows operating system and Office software.

5.14 Chinese courts and regulators have also been pro-active in developing guidance on the assessment of IPRs under the AML. The three antitrust agencies are formulating IPR-related antitrust guidelines separately.

5.15 The SAIC for its part has been engaged in a lengthy process of developing and consulting on guidelines regarding its approach to IPRs in antitrust enforcement. After more than five years of preparation and many rounds of consultation, the Regulation on the Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Eliminate or Restrict Competition (IP Regulation) came into effect on 1 August 2015.

5.16 The IP Regulation addresses intellectual property-related abusive conduct and (to a lesser extent) anticompetitive agreements, and covers specific issues such as exclusive dealing, tying, imposition of unreasonable conditions, differential treatment, patent pools and standard setting. The provision which has given rise to the most concerns among companies (both PRC and foreign) and foreign competition agencies (including the US Department of Justice) is the introduction of the essential facilities doctrine into an analysis of the exercise of IPRs under the AML. In particular, the IP Regulation provides that a dominant undertaking is prohibited from refusing, without justification, to license its IPRs on reasonable terms where such rights constitute essential facilities for manufacturing and operating activities. The SAIC has taken on board some of the concerns raised during the public consultation. As a result, the IP Regulation sets out a number of conditions which must be satisfied in order for IPRs to be considered essential facilities. Nonetheless, the adoption of such a doctrine, and the scope for the SAIC to adopt a wide approach in interpreting such criteria, results in considerable uncertainty for intellectual property holders.

5.17 Separately, the NDRC published its own IPR-related antitrust guidelines in December 2015 and MOFCOM drafted a reference framework for reviewing mergers involving IPRs in October 2015. Given the significant overlap between these guidelines, it is understood that the Antitrust Committee of the State Council is considering whether to consolidate these three guidelines into one.

5.18 The SPC has been actively consulting and publishing judicial opinions on the trial of patent cases. In early 2015 the SPC published the Interim Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Issues Concerning the Participation of Technical Investigators of Intellectual Property Courts in Litigation Activities, which allows intellectual property courts to appoint technical investigators when hearing cases involving highly technical subjects such as patents, new plant varieties, integrated circuit
designs, technical secrets and computer software. In the same period the SPC also published the revised Several Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Issues Concerning Applicable Laws on the Trial of Patent Controversies, which came into effect on 1 February 2015. The revisions relate to articles on infringement, the extent of protection of patent rights, the application of Chinese Patent Law, patent counterfeits, and the calculation of loss and income as a result of infringement.

5.19 In March 2016 the SPC published the Judicial Interpretation (II) on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Patent Infringement Cases, which came into effect in April 2016. The interpretation sets out rules that ensure licensing terms and conditions of SEPs are to be determined under FRAND principles. It also specifies that infringement claims from patentees which violate FRAND principles upon failing to negotiate in good faith with licensees will generally be rejected by the courts.
6. Merger control

6.1 From an enforcement perspective, merger control is currently by far the most advanced of the three types of monopolistic conduct, not least because merger filings were required under a different set of rules, the Provisions on the Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (M&A Rules), in the PRC before the implementation of the AML. The M&A Rules were subsequently revised in June 2009 to bring them in line with the AML jurisdictional thresholds.

Jurisdictional thresholds

6.2 The turnover thresholds are as follows (see Figure 2 below for flowchart):

- either the combined global turnover of all the undertakings concerned (e.g. the purchaser group and the target) exceeds RMB10 billion (c. €1.4 billion) or the combined turnover within the PRC of all the undertakings concerned exceeds RMB2 billion (c. €289 million), in the preceding financial year; and

- the turnover within the PRC of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned in the preceding financial year exceeds RMB400 million (c. €58 million).

6.3 As in the EU and US, there are special turnover threshold rules in the PRC for financial institutions, such as banks and insurance companies, which are already regulated by other agencies (e.g. the China Banking Regulatory Commission). The AML rules state that once all the various income items belonging to the financial institution have been aggregated, only 10 per cent of the aggregate will be taken into account for the purposes of the turnover thresholds.

6.4 In addition, MOFCOM has the right to investigate a merger not exceeding the turnover thresholds where “facts and evidence collected in accordance with prescribed procedures establish that such concentration effects, or is likely to effect, the elimination or restriction of competition”. It remains unclear under what circumstances MOFCOM will exercise this power, but some guidelines have been provided in MOFCOM’s Interim Provisions on Assessment of the Impact of Concentration of Undertakings on Competition. There have been no such reported cases to date and MOFCOM is likely to do so only in cases where serious competition concerns are expected to arise or in high-profile product markets.

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7 The Euro figures in this publication have been calculated by reference to the average 2015 exchange rate.

8 Art.4, Provisions of the State Council on Thresholds for Prior Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings (Decree of the State Council of the PRC No. 529) (taken from official English translation on MOFCOM’s website).
On June 2014 MOFCOM revised the Guideline for Notification of Concentration of Undertakings (Guideline) to clarify what types of transaction require merger control clearance. The Guideline explains for the first time what constitutes control and clarifies the situation for joint ventures and calculation of revenues.

According to Article 1 of the Guideline, “concentration of undertakings” means the circumstances stipulated in Article 20 AML, including merger of undertakings, acquisition of control over other undertakings by acquiring their equity or assets and gaining control or decisive influence over other undertakings by contracts or other means. Control can be acquired either by the undertakings themselves directly or by their controlled undertakings indirectly. Article 3 of the Guideline states that control of a concentration includes sole control and joint control. It also notes that transaction documents and constitutional documents (e.g. bylaws) are relevant evidence in assessing whether an undertaking is acquiring control.

The Guideline does not adopt any percentage threshold for establishing control. It recognises the possibility of acquiring de facto control through acquisition of a small stake due to reasons such as fragmented ownership.
The Guideline also lists seven non-exhaustive factors that MOFCOM will take into consideration when deciding whether a transaction entails the acquisition of control. These include:

- the objectives of the transaction and relevant future plans;
- the change in the shareholding structure;
- the voting agenda and voting mechanism of shareholders’ meetings, past attendance rate and resolutions;
- the structure and voting mechanism of the board of directors and board of supervisors;
- the appointment and dismissal of senior executives;
- the relationship between shareholders and directors, and whether there are any proxy votes or persons acting in concert; and
- whether there is a significant commercial relationship or a cooperation agreement between the undertakings.

The Guideline makes it clear that the merger notification obligation applies to joint ventures. According to Article 4, newly established joint ventures should only be notified where two or more undertakings acquire joint control. If only one undertaking controls the joint venture, this will not be considered a concentration of undertakings.

It is important to bear in mind that, unlike the EU, MOFCOM does not distinguish between full-function and non-full-function joint ventures. Close-knit alliances may also attract regulatory scrutiny under merger control in the PRC. A striking example is the proposed P3 alliance between AP. Møller-Maersk A/S, Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A. and CMA-CGM S.A. The proposed alliance was considered to be a relevant concentration under the AML and thus notifiable to MOFCOM, but it was not a full-function joint venture and thus not notifiable under the EU merger control regime.

The Guideline further clarifies the calculation of turnover. Under Article 5 of the Guideline, the turnover “within China” refers to the turnover generated from sales to customers located within the PRC and therefore includes overseas imports into the PRC, but not exports from the PRC.

MOFCOM is currently in the process of revising the Guideline (together with the Guideline for Review of Concentration of Undertakings), which will further reflect the experience and practices of MOFCOM.

Merger notification process

According to Article 25 AML, the initial merger review period (Phase I) is 30 days. In practice, this period does not start as soon as the parties submit the notification to MOFCOM but only after MOFCOM accepts the notification as complete. During the period between submission and acceptance (often referred to as the pre-acceptance period), MOFCOM is almost certain to request supplementary information.
documents and information. This delay can be reduced to some extent by preparing as complete a notification as possible from the outset and by responding to MOFCOM’s (often very lengthy) information requests as quickly as possible, but it can be difficult to predict with any certainty when the review period will start. Notifying parties should generally allow at least 2 to 4 months for this process (although this varies according to MOFCOM’s workload).

6.14 After the initial review period, MOFCOM can extend its review by a further 90 days if a more detailed investigation is required (commonly referred to as Phase II), which in turn can be further extended by up to 60 days in specific circumstances, e.g. if the merging parties agree (Phase III). Unlike the EU, there is no substantive threshold for MOFCOM to commence a Phase II review; it may do so simply because it does not have sufficient time to complete its review in the initial 30 days. In cases where MOFCOM requires additional time beyond Phase III, the notifying parties may choose to withdraw and re-file the notification to restart the timetable (Western Digital/Hitachi, Glencore/Xstrata, Marubeni/Gavilon, MediaTeck/Mstar, AMAT/Tokyo Electron and Dell/EMC).

The simplified procedure

6.15 On 11 February 2014 MOFCOM announced its long-awaited fast-track simplified procedure for “simple cases” that do not raise competition concerns in the PRC. The aim of the new procedure is to speed up the merger review process which could see “60 per cent of notified transactions” cleared within Phase 1. The simplified procedure has two key advantages: it significantly shortens the time taken to obtain merger approvals and reduces the administrative burden on notifying parties for simple cases.

6.16 The simplified procedure is available for the following types of transactions:

- off-shore joint ventures with no activities in the PRC;
- changes from joint to sole control of a joint venture (except where the sole parent and the joint venture compete in the same market); or
- transaction where the parties have a combined market share of less than 15 per cent if they compete in the same market; and each have market share of less than 25 per cent if they are active in any vertically related or neighbouring markets.

6.17 In our experience, the simplified procedure is a positive development with the vast majority of cases being cleared within Phase I. The first case to take advantage of the simplified procedure was Rolls-Royce Holdings plc’s acquisition of Daimler AG’s 50 per cent shareholding in their 50:50 joint venture, Rolls-Royce Power Systems (which we acted on). It was cleared by MOFCOM only 19 days after formal acceptance.

6.18 For simple cases, MOFCOM publishes a notice on its website for consultation with third parties for ten calendar days. Whilst the simplified procedure facilitates speedy review, it also increases transparency and may attract complaints more easily. As of 31 October 2016, 549 simple cases have been published for review.

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10 The Interim Provisions on the Standards Applicable to Simple Cases of Concentration of Undertakings (the Simplified Procedure Notice), effective from 12 February 2014. This was followed on 18 April 2014 by Guidance on the Notification Procedure for Simple Cases.

11 Shang Ming, Director General of MOFCOM’s Anti Monopoly Bureau (16 September 2013).

12 Art.2, Simplified Procedure Notice.
6.19 MOFCOM unconditionally approved 85 cases in the third quarter of 2016, bringing the number of cases which MOFCOM has unconditionally cleared since the implementation of the AML to 1535 (as of 30 September 2016). These have been made public since 15 November 2012 pursuant to the Regulation on the Disclosure of Government Information. As of 31 October 2016, MOFCOM has prohibited two transactions: The Coca-Cola Company’s proposed acquisition of Chinese juice producer China Huiyuan Juice Group Ltd (prohibited in March 2009); and the proposed P3 alliance by the AP. Møller-Maersk Line, MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co and CMA-CGM (prohibited in June 2014). As of 31 October 2016, 27 clearance decisions have been made subject to conditions (often involving a mixture of behavioural and structural remedies).

**Substantive assessment**

6.20 In assessing mergers, MOFCOM considers whether the merger will or may eliminate or restrict market competition. Even if this test appears to be met, it remains open to the parties to prove that the advantages of the merger outweigh the disadvantages or that it is in line with the public interest.  

6.21 In August 2011 MOFCOM published its Provisional Rules on the Assessment of Competitive Effects of a Concentration which sets out the factors that MOFCOM will consider when making its substantive assessment. This includes concepts that are familiar to the EU and other competition regimes (market shares, degree of concentration by reference to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the Concentration Ratio, barriers to entry, technological barriers, production capacity in the market etc.). In addition, it identifies certain possible defences, including public interest, economic efficiency, undertakings on the verge of bankruptcy and countervailing buyer power. However, MOFCOM has not adopted the same terminology in respect of the theories of harm - for example, the rules do not refer to “coordinated” or “unilateral” effects - thereby enabling MOFCOM to retain a greater degree of flexibility when assessing transactions.

6.22 MOFCOM’s recent SABMiller/AB InBev decision on 29 July 2016 illustrates the factors considered by MOFCOM in its substantive assessment of concentrations under the AML. Among other things, MOFCOM took into account: the market shares of the merger parties relative to their competitors, post-merger conduct which may increase entry barriers and the relative bargaining positions of downstream distributors. In this regard, MOFCOM’s analysis can be contrasted with that of the European Commission which focused on the likelihood of tacit price coordination.

**Overview of conditional clearance and prohibition decisions to date**

6.23 MOFCOM has imposed both structural and behavioural conditions on merging parties. In appropriate cases, companies are able to propose behavioural remedies to address MOFCOM’s competition concerns as an alternative to structural remedies which tend to be preferred by the EU and US antitrust agencies. It is also worth noting that, as in other jurisdictions, customer or third party concerns can play a significant role in MOFCOM’s assessment of a proposed merger.

6.24 Recent cases have highlighted the fact that the outcome of MOFCOM investigations can sometimes be unpredictable and uncertain, even where market shares may appear to be relatively low. In some international mergers, MOFCOM has intervened by imposing conditions even where a transaction has already received unconditional clearances in other jurisdictions, or by going beyond the conditions...
that have been imposed in other jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{14} This can be the case even where the market shares might not, prima facie, appear to raise competition concerns. For example, the markets in which MOFCOM expressed concerns in \textit{Glencore/Xstrata} involved market shares of less than 18 per cent; similarly, in \textit{Marubeni/Gavilon}, MOFCOM had concerns about Marubeni’s 18 per cent share of the imported soybean market in China. MOFCOM has also prohibited transactions which were cleared or not prohibited elsewhere. For example, the proposed P3 alliance, which was cleared by the US Federal Maritime Commission and in respect of which the European Commission decided not to initiate proceedings, was prohibited by MOFCOM on 17 June 2014 as MOFCOM considered that it may have an anti-competitive effect on Asian-European shipping routes. Similarly, in \textit{Google/Motorola, Microsoft/Nokia} and \textit{Nokia/Alcatel-Lucent}, MOFCOM imposed behavioural remedies and required the relevant undertakings to continue observing their FRAND obligations notwithstanding that no other competition authority (including the European Commission and the US authorities) required any commitments from the notifying party.

\textbf{Merger remedies}

6.25 On 4 December 2014 MOFCOM published the Interim Regulations on Imposing Restrictive Conditions on Concentrations of Undertakings (Remedies Regulations). According to MOFCOM, the Remedies Regulations aim at improving the enforcement and monitoring of merger conditions as well as reducing any negative impact on competition brought by concentrations.

6.26 The Remedies Regulations set out the process for negotiation and determination of remedies. MOFCOM requires remedy proposals to be submitted within 20 days before the end of Phase II.\textsuperscript{15} The Remedies Regulations also contain a ‘crown jewel’ provision under which MOFCOM may require the undertakings concerned to provide an alternative proposal that contains stricter conditions and may include core tangible and intangible assets.\textsuperscript{16} MOFCOM may market test the remedy proposals by way of (i) questionnaire; (ii) hearings; (iii) consultation with experts; or (iv) other means.\textsuperscript{17}

6.27 The Remedies Regulations prescribe detailed requirements for the implementation of remedies, including the criteria for choosing suitable purchasers, monitoring trustees and divestiture trustees, the duties of monitoring trustees and divestiture trustees and the duties of the undertakings subject to the divestment commitments. The Remedies Regulations provide that MOFCOM may require an upfront buyer where (i) the viability and marketability of the business to be divested is at risk; (ii) the identity of the purchaser of the divestment business is critical to the effectiveness of the remedies in restoring competition; or (iii) third parties assert rights over the divestment business.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{14} For example, see \textit{Western Digital/Hitachi, Google/Motorola Mobility, Glencore/Xstrata, Marubeni/Gavilon, and Baxter International Inc./Gambro AB.}

\textsuperscript{15} Art. 6, Remedies Regulations.

\textsuperscript{16} Art. 7, Remedies Regulations.

\textsuperscript{17} Art. 8, Remedies Regulations.

\textsuperscript{18} Art. 14, Remedies Regulations.
7. **Private action**

7.1 Private claims for damages resulting from anti-competitive conduct is a growing area in the PRC, not least because customers have been quick to rely on Article 50 AML, which entitles individuals and companies to bring private actions against undertakings that have engaged in monopolistic conduct. The courts have been remarkably willing to hear such cases, despite the lack of implementing rules or any historic expertise or experience in conducting the necessary competitive assessment.

7.2 The first court decision on an Article 50 private damages claim was handed down on 23 October 2009. The Shanghai No.1 Intermediate People’s Court rejected the claim on the basis that the claimant, Beijing Sursen Electronic Co Ltd, had failed to produce sufficient evidence that the defendants, Shanda Interactive Entertainment Limited and Shanghai Xuanting Entertainment Information Technology Co., Ltd, were dominant. Sursen alleged that the defendants had abused their dominant positions by pressuring two authors not to write a sequel to a novel series that was originally published by the defendants. The value of the claim was RMB 9,800. In addition, the Court held that the defendants were justified in their actions as they were entitled to enforce their IPRs. This decision was upheld by the Shanghai Higher People’s Court.

7.3 Follow-on damages claims are also being brought in China. In August 2016 the Beijing High People’s Court upheld a first instance decision by the Beijing Intellectual Property Court rejecting an antitrust follow-on claim brought by a private Chinese individual against Abbott Laboratories Trading (Shanghai) and Beijing Carrefour Commercial (Shuangjing Store) over alleged resale price maintenance, which was the subject of an administrative penalty decision imposed by the NDRC in 2013 (See Chapter 4 above). The Court’s decision (published online in November 2016) ruled that insufficient evidence had been provided to prove the existence of a vertical-restraint agreement between Abbott and its retailer Carrefour. The ruling suggests that plaintiffs in follow-on claims bear a high evidentiary burden of proof. In particular, the Court ruled that the NDRC’s penalty decision could only support the claim that Abbott had engaged in resale price maintenance with its retailers, but was not sufficient to prove a restraint agreement between Abbott and Carrefour as the NDRC’s penalty decision did not mention any counterparty (whether wholesaler or retailer) to Abbott’s resale price maintenance agreements. As such, the plaintiff failed to establish a causal link between his purported loss (being merely RMB 10.44 plus legal costs) and the conduct identified in the NDRC’s 2013 decision.

7.4 Other high profile cases include:

- **Qihoo v. Tencent**, which was the first competition case to be heard by the Supreme People’s Court and involved complex issues of market definition and expert evidence from international competition economists;

- **Rainbow Medical Equipment & Supply Company v Johnson & Johnson**, which was the first time the courts decided on issues of resale price maintenance. The Shanghai courts appeared to adopt a ‘rule of reason’ approach to the question of resale price maintenance;

- **Huawei v. InterDigital**, which involved intellectual property issues regarding essential patents. The Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court (affirmed by the Guangdong Higher People’s Court) determined the level of royalties payable for use of InterDigital’s essential patents; and

- **Ningbo Ketian Magnet, Ningbo Permanent Magnetics, Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry v. Hitachi Metals**, which involves abuse of dominance
in relation to the licensing of rare earth magnet patents. The case is pending judgment. The judgment is expected to set a precedent in the PRC as to whether sanctions can be imposed for refusing to license a non-essential patent (in particular, whether the PRC courts will adopt an essential facilities doctrine).

7.5 In a step which has been applauded for introducing greater transparency in the country’s legal system, the Supreme People’s Court began publishing rulings online in July 2013. However, the degree of disclosure remains uneven; decisions are published intermittently in batches, and cases involving national security, commercial secrets and individual privacy will not be posted.
8. National security review

8.1 Pursuant to Article 31 AML, a separate national security review, with a separate review process and timetable, might be necessary if a transaction involves the acquisition (including of de facto control) of a domestic PRC company by a foreign investor in certain sectors. This includes military industrial enterprises and enterprises located near key and sensitive military facilities, national defence enterprises, enterprises with a bearing on national security in areas including important agricultural products, energy and resources, infrastructure facilities, transportation services, key technologies and manufacturing of major equipment. Provisional rules were issued in March 2011, which were superseded by a new set of rules issued in August 2011.

8.2 National security reviews fall within MOFCOM’s jurisdiction. Local commerce departments are responsible for screening - during the foreign investment approval process - whether the relevant transaction requires a national security review. In addition, third parties such as other governmental agencies, industry associations and enterprises in the same or upstream/downstream industries can also trigger this process by proposing to MOFCOM that a review be conducted. Alternatively, parties may make a voluntary filing to MOFCOM for a national security review.

8.3 MOFCOM has an initial 15 working days to determine if the transaction falls within the scope of a national security review. If so, the case is passed on to the ministerial joint committee co-chaired by MOFCOM and NDRC, which then has up to 90 working days (30 working days for a ‘general’ review period, followed by a further 60 working days of a ‘special’ review period) to issue a decision. If a case requires both a national security review and a merger review, MOFCOM is likely in practice to postpone acceptance of the merger notification until the joint committee has issued its decision on the national security aspects of the transaction.
Annex: Hong Kong

Introduction

On 14 December 2015 the Hong Kong Competition Ordinance (Ordinance) came into full effect, marking the first cross-sector competition law in Hong Kong. Previously, only the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors were subject to competition law. The coming into effect of the Ordinance aligns Hong Kong with the more than 100 other jurisdictions around the world with competition law regimes in place.

The Competition Commission (Commission) was established under the Ordinance as Hong Kong’s competition regulator and is empowered with broad investigative powers to enforce breaches of the Ordinance. Unlike in certain other jurisdictions, the Ordinance follows a prosecutorial model of competition enforcement. The Commission must bring enforcement actions before the Competition Tribunal (Tribunal), the specialist court tasked with deciding competition cases arising from the Ordinance, in order to seek pecuniary penalties and other sanctions.

In the run-up to December 2015 the Commission published a number of guidelines and policies which provide guidance on how the Commission and the Communications Authority (which has concurrent jurisdiction with the Commission in respect of competition matters relating to telecommunications) would interpret and give effect to the provisions of the Ordinance. These include the Guidelines under the Ordinance (Guidelines), which cover six substantive and procedural topics, namely: (i) the First Conduct Rule (prohibiting anticompetitive agreements and concerted practices); (ii) the Second Conduct Rule (prohibiting abuses of substantial market power); (iii) the Merger Rule (prohibiting mergers that substantially lessen competition, applying only to the telecommunications sector); (iv) complaints; (v) investigations; and (vi) applications for decisions and block exemption orders.

What does the Ordinance cover?

The Ordinance prohibits the following three types of anti-competitive practices:

- **Anti-competitive agreements:** agreements, concerted practices or decisions between undertakings with the object or effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition in Hong Kong (the First Conduct Rule);

- **Abuse of market power:** abuse by undertakings with a “substantial degree of market power” by engaging in conduct with the object or effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition in Hong Kong (the Second Conduct Rule);

- **Telecommunications mergers:** with respect to telecommunications licensees, any merger that has, or is likely to have, the effect of substantially lessening competition in Hong Kong (the Merger Rule). The current intention is not to extend the merger regime to other sectors, although the Government has indicated that this position may be reviewed in the next few years.

The Ordinance further defines certain hardcore activities as “serious anti-competitive conduct” in relation to the First Conduct Rule. These consist of: price-fixing, bid-rigging, market allocation and output control. They are considered to be particularly serious offences and will be subject to a stricter enforcement regime as set out below.
First conduct rule: anti-competitive agreements

What does this catch?

The First Conduct Rule prohibits any agreement (or concerted practice) which has an anti-competitive object or effect in the Hong Kong market. The following are four basic “don’ts” in relation to conduct with competitors:

- Don’t discuss prices, discounts, rebates, supply terms, profit margins or any other terms of business or exchange any commercially sensitive information.
- Don’t agree to limit production, markets, technical development or investment.
- Don’t agree to share markets, territories, customers or sources of supply.
- Don’t engage in bid-rigging (e.g. agreeing on the terms of the bid, agreeing not to submit a bid or agreeing to withdraw a bid).

Are “vertical agreements” caught?

The Guidelines indicate the Commission's approach that vertical agreements (agreements between businesses at different levels of the supply chain) are, as a general matter, unlikely to be considered serious anti-competitive conduct, and are generally less harmful to competition compared to horizontal agreements. The Commission has however not granted any exemption for vertical agreements, but provides in the Guidelines that they may have the object or effect of harming competition, particularly where they have foreclosure effects or facilitate horizontal coordination. The Guidelines, however, acknowledge that they are unlikely to give rise to competition concerns unless there is market power, and that they offer greater scope for efficiencies.

How does the First Conduct Rule apply to trade associations?

It is generally recognised that trade associations can be beneficial in improving standards and ensuring better service to customers. However, they also provide the opportunity for competitors to discuss various issues that fall on the wrong side of the line. Therefore, trade associations must be careful to ensure that any exchange of information is compliant with competition law.

Are there any other exclusions?

The Ordinance contains a de minimis exclusion from the First Conduct Rule for all agreements between undertakings with a combined annual global turnover not exceeding HK$200 million, provided such agreements do not constitute serious anti-competitive conduct. In respect of corporate groups, the Commission’s guidance note, How to Assess “Turnover” for Exclusions from the Competition Ordinance Conduct Rules, makes it clear that the turnover assessment would cover all companies that form the same economic unit (i.e. are controlled by the same ultimate parent).

In addition, there are certain exclusions for agreements which enhance economic efficiency, which are undertaken to comply with legal requirements or are undertaken by undertakings entrusted by the Government with the operation of services of general economic interest.
Second conduct rule: abuse of market power

What constitutes a “substantial degree of market power”?

An undertaking that does not face sufficiently effective competitive constraints on a relevant market (i.e. the ability to price above competitive levels or restrict output or quality below competitive levels) is likely to be found to have a “substantial degree of market power”. In practice, a substantial degree of market power may arise where an undertaking has a significant proportion of the business in a relevant market.

Note that this is a different threshold than the “dominance” test adopted in the EU, China, Singapore and other jurisdictions. In drafting the Ordinance, the Government was concerned to ensure that the Second Conduct Rule should be capable of applying to the many sectors in Hong Kong that have two or three big players, none of which would be dominant.

The Guideline on the Second Conduct Rule does not refer to any indicative threshold for a substantial degree of market power to arise, although the Government has previously indicated that an undertaking with a market share of less than 25 per cent is unlikely to have a substantial degree of market power.

What conduct would be caught?

The Ordinance confers on businesses with a “substantial degree of market power” a special responsibility not to engage in behaviour that is considered abusive and which has an anti-competitive object or effect on the Hong Kong market. Conduct will be abusive where it is “exclusionary”, i.e. it prevents competitors from competing effectively or drives them out of the market.

Examples of “abuse” could include predatory pricing (i.e. pricing below cost so as to drive a competitor out of the market), loyalty enhancing rebate schemes, exclusive dealing, tying/bundling and a refusal to supply an essential input to an actual or potential competitor.

What about “exploitative” conduct?

Exploitative conduct is conduct which is unfair to customers (typically excessive pricing).

The Ordinance does not distinguish between “exclusionary” and “exploitative” conduct but the Commission has indicated in its Enforcement Policy (published in November 2015) that its focus is on the former.

Are there any exclusions?

The Ordinance contains a de minimis exclusion from the Second Conduct Rule for all undertakings with annual global turnover not exceeding HK$40 million. Again, in respect of corporate groups, the Commission’s guidance note on How to Assess “Turnover” for Exclusions from the Competition Ordinance Conduct Rules makes it clear that the turnover assessment would cover all companies that form the same economic unit (i.e. are controlled by the same ultimate parent).

In addition, as with the First Conduct Rule, there are certain exclusions for conduct undertaken to comply with legal requirements or undertaken by undertakings entrusted by the Government with the operation of services of general economic interest.
What powers will the authorities have to investigate a potential breach?

The Commission is given a full range of powers in the Ordinance to investigate suspected breaches. These powers include the power to require production of documents and information, to require individuals to attend interviews before the Commission and, if armed with a court warrant, to enter and search premises (i.e. a dawn raid).

Members of the Commission and the Tribunal

The Government announced the reappointment of all 14 prior members of the Commission for a two-year term beginning 1 May 2016, and the appointment of one new member, making a total of 15 members. Anna Wu, a former chairperson of the Consumer Council, has been reappointed as chairperson. The other members represent sectors such as law, economics, consumer protection, financial services, commerce and industry. In addition to its members, the Commission is also operated by its executive arm. The current Chief Executive Officer of the Commission is Ms. Rose Webb, previously of the Australian competition authority.

Mr. Justice Godfrey Lam and Madam Justice Queeny Au-Yeung were reappointed as President and Deputy President, respectively, of the Tribunal, each for terms of three years with effect from 1 August 2016. Every judge of the Court of First Instance will, by virtue of his or her appointment as such, be a member of the Tribunal.

What penalties can be imposed on a business that breaches the Ordinance?

Warning notices and infringement notices

If the alleged breach of the First Conduct Rule does not amount to “serious anti-competitive conduct” (discussed above), then the Commission must issue a “warning notice” requesting the relevant undertaking to cease the relevant conduct within a specified period before instituting proceedings in the Tribunal. Only if the undertaking fails to comply with the warning notice, or repeats the anti-competitive conduct after initial rectification, may the Commission bring proceedings against that undertaking.

If the alleged breach amounts to “serious anti-competitive conduct” or a breach of the Second Conduct Rule, no warning notice can be issued. The Commission may instead choose to bring proceedings in the Tribunal straight away, or it may issue an “infringement notice” which would describe the alleged infringing conduct, set out the evidence on which the Commission formed its view and state the terms on which the Commission would be willing to settle the matter without bringing proceedings in the Tribunal.

At any stage of the Commission’s investigation, the relevant undertakings can offer commitments to take certain action or refrain from taking action to address the Commission’s concerns in lieu of further investigation or formal proceedings in the Tribunal.

The Commission issued its Leniency Policy for Undertakings engaged in Cartel Conduct in November 2015. The Commission’s policy is to provide immunity from pecuniary penalty to the first cartel member who reports the cartel conduct to the Commission. It has left the position open with respect to subsequent members who come forward with information on the cartel.
Sanctions available to the Tribunal

If proceedings are brought in the Tribunal and a breach of the First or Second Conduct Rule is found, the Ordinance gives the Tribunal the power to apply a full range of remedies, including:

- financial penalties of up to 10 per cent of Hong Kong turnover for a maximum of three years of the breach;
- disgorgement orders (i.e. to pay back the illegal profits made from the breach);
- damages awards to aggrieved parties;
- injunctions; and
- disqualification orders against directors.

Follow-on actions for damages

If the Tribunal (or other court) finds that an undertaking has breached the First or Second Conduct Rule, or the undertaking makes an admission of breach in its commitments to the Commission, a third party which has suffered loss as a result of the breach is able to bring a private action for damages against the relevant undertaking before the Tribunal.

The ruling of the Tribunal (or the relevant appeal court) as to liability in respect of proceedings brought by the Commission will be binding in any follow-on action. The claimant would need to prove only causation and quantum.

The limitation period for follow-on actions is three years from the expiry of the appeal period following a court decision that the Ordinance has been breached.

The Ordinance does not provide for a standalone right of action (i.e. where the Tribunal or relevant appeal court has not found a breach).

Conclusion

The coming into effect of the Ordinance is a significant step towards enhancing competition and consumer welfare in Hong Kong, but it also presents a big challenge for the business community. Businesses will now have to embark on a journey of understanding and implementing competition law principles, which may in some cases require fundamental changes to the way business is done in Hong Kong.