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Cartels are a surprisingly persistent feature of economic life. The temptation to rig the game in one's favour is constant, particularly when demand conditions are weak and the product in question is an undifferentiated commodity. Corporate compliance programmes are useful but inherently limited, as managers may come to see their personal interests as divergent from those of the corporation. Detection of cartel arrangements can present a substantial challenge for both internal legal departments and law enforcement. Some notable cartels managed to remain intact for as long as a decade before they were uncovered. Some may never see the light of day. However, for those cartels that are detected, this compendium offers a resource for practitioners around the world.

This book brings together leading competition law experts from more than two dozen jurisdictions to address an issue of growing importance to large corporations, their managers and their lawyers: the potential liability, both civil and criminal, that may arise from unlawful agreements with competitors as to price, markets or output. The broad message of the book is that this risk is growing steadily. In part due to US leadership, stubborn cultural attitudes regarding cartel activity are gradually shifting. Many jurisdictions have moved to give their competition authorities additional investigative tools, including wiretap authority and broad subpoena powers. There is also a burgeoning movement to criminalise cartel activity in jurisdictions where it has previously been regarded as wholly or principally a civil matter. The growing use of leniency programmes has worked to radically destabilise global cartels, creating powerful incentives to report cartel activity when discovered.

The authors of these chapters are from some of the most widely respected law firms in their jurisdictions. All have substantial experience with cartel investigations, and many have served in senior positions in government. They know both what the law says and how it is actually enforced, and we think you will find their guidance regarding the practices of local competition authorities invaluable. This book seeks to provide both breadth of coverage (with chapters on 31 jurisdictions) and analytical depth to those practitioners who may find themselves on the front lines of a government inquiry or an internal investigation into suspect practices.
Editor's Preface

Our emphasis is necessarily on established law and policy, but discussion of emerging or unsettled issues has been provided where appropriate.

This is the second edition of The Cartels and Leniency Review. We hope that you will find it a useful resource. The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and not those of their firms, the editor or the publisher. Every endeavour has been made to make updates until the last possible date before publication to ensure that what you read is the latest intelligence.

Christine A Varney
Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP
New York
January 2014
I ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND GUIDANCE

Both EU and national competition laws apply to cartels in the European Union. The relevant EU competition law provision is Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the TFEU). The relevant national competition law provisions in respect of a number of the Member States are covered in other chapters of this book.

Article 101(1) of the TFEU provides that ‘all agreements between undertakings,\(^2\) decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices that may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market’ are prohibited. As a matter of practice, any agreement between competitors or potential competitors that fixes prices, limits output, shares markets, customers or sources of supply will generally be regarded as an agreement restricting competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) of the TFEU.

The principal enforcement agency in the EU is the European Commission, with the Competition Directorate General (DG Competition) primarily responsible for the enforcement of the competition rules. However, in accordance with Regulation 1/2003,\(^3\) the national competition authorities (NCAs) throughout the EU are also fully competent to enforce Article 101 of the TFEU as well as their domestic competition rules to cartels.\(^4\)

---

1 Philippe Chappatte is a partner and Paul Walter is a special adviser at Slaughter and May.
2 Article 101 of the TFEU applies to ‘undertakings’. The concept of undertaking is defined broadly and can extend to any legal or natural person engaged in an economic or commercial activity (whether or not it is profit-making).
4 Article 3(1) of Regulation 1/2003 provides that, if an NCA within the EU uses domestic competition law to investigate a cartel that may affect trade between Member States, it must
National courts must also apply Article 101 of the TFEU to such conduct in addition to national antitrust rules.

The Commission has extensive powers of investigation and inspection, including the power to demand the production of information, take statements from individuals, search private premises and seal premises or business records.\(^5\) The Commission also has wide discretion to impose substantial fines for cartel behaviour in breach of Article 101 of the TFEU and for breaches of the procedural rules, for example, for failure to provide information.

The European Competition Commissioner, Joaquín Almunia recently stated that cartels impose a ‘private, hidden tax on the economy’ and that ‘it is more vital than ever that we stamp it out.’\(^6\) The Commission is, however, prepared to offer lenient treatment to businesses that come forward with information about a cartel in which they are involved. The framework principles for the Commission's leniency policy are set out in the Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases (the Leniency Notice) and are discussed in further detail below. The Commission has also published various notices providing guidance for the application of Article 101 of the TFEU, including notices on, \textit{inter alia}, fines and handling complaints.

\section*{II COOPERATION WITH OTHER JURISDICTIONS}

\subsection{i Cooperation within the EU}

There is close cooperation in the application of the EU competition rules between the Commission and European NCAs within the framework of the European Competition Network (the ECN). For example, authorities may ask each other for assistance in collecting information in their respective territories. The members of the ECN can also exchange information, including confidential information, for the purpose of applying Article 101 of the TFEU or for parallel proceedings under national competition law.\(^7\)

The ECN members also cooperate with a view to ensuring the efficient allocation of cases. When an authority is assigned a case, it may decide to reallocate that case to another authority if it is better placed to deal with it. The Commission is usually best placed to handle an investigation if the cartel has an impact on competition in at least three Member States, whereas an NCA will normally be best placed if it mainly affects

\begin{itemize}
  \item also apply Article 101 of the TFEU.
  \item Moreover, national competition rules should not be used to prohibit agreements that are compatible with the EU competition rules or to authorise agreements that are prohibited under the EU competition rules.
  \item The key provisions regarding the Commission's cartel enforcement procedures are set out in Regulation 1/2003. Further relevant provisions are set out in Regulation No. 773/2004, which governs the initiation of proceedings, conduct of investigations, handling of complaints and hearing of parties.
  \item Joaquín Almunia, Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Competition Policy: 'European and global perspectives for competition policy', 21 March 2013.
  \item See Paragraphs 40 and 41 of the Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities (the Cooperation Notice).
\end{itemize}
competition within its territory. Where the Commission initiates proceedings in relation to a case, this will end the NCA’s competence to apply Article 101 of the TFEU to the same conduct. However, parallel action by the Commission and the NCA is possible when they focus on cases that are not the same in terms of product or geographical markets.

Whether or not conduct is the ‘same’ can, in certain circumstances, be a contentious issue. In the Consumer Detergents case, the EU and national investigations took place at the same time, and the Commission adopted its final decision only a few months earlier than the final decision of the French NCA. One of the parties took the view that the anti-competitive arrangements pursued by the Commission and the French NCA were the same, namely that they formed a single infringement or at least two closely related infringements concerning the same case. In particular, the party argued that it presented the same facts in its leniency submissions to the Commission and the French NCA, and thus it should have obtained full immunity from both authorities. However, both the French NCA and the Commission rejected the party’s arguments, and considered that the EU and the French proceedings did not concern the same case given certain differences in the type of conduct, products, geographic location and participants.

In September 2006, the ECN published its Model Leniency Programme, which is intended to simplify the burden for applicants and authorities in cases of multiple leniency applications. One of the key features of the programme is that it envisages undertakings making summary applications to NCAs where the Commission is particularly well placed to deal with a case. These applications are intended to help the applicant protect its position by securing its place in the queue before the NCA. The ECN published a revised programme in November 2012, which is intended to further simplify the process and make it easier for undertakings to protect their position pending resolution of the case allocation issues.

ii Cooperation with non-EU countries

The EU also has cooperation agreements with a number of non-EU countries, notably the US, China, Canada, Australia, Japan, Switzerland, Brazil and South Korea. These agreements can help the Commission to obtain information and evidence located outside the EU. These agreements do not, however, allow the Commission to disclose confidential information received in the course of its investigations. Due to this restriction, it is common for the Commission to request the investigated parties to provide waivers in order to allow it to discuss cases with other competition authorities. Commissioner Almunia recently noted that the European Commission worked with

8 See Paragraph 5 et seq. of the Cooperation Notice.
9 See Paragraph 51 of the Cooperation Notice.
10 Commission Decision of 13 April 2011 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (COMP/39579 – Consumer Detergents) and Decision No. 11-D-17 of 8 December 2011 relating to practices implemented in the laundry detergent sector.
competition agencies outside of the EU in around 60 per cent of cartel investigations during the period from 2010 to 2011.11

III JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATIONS, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENCES AND EXEMPTIONS

i Extraterritoriality

Article 101 TFEU can apply to agreements between undertakings located outside the EU if they have effects on competition within the EU. The European Court of Justice (the ECJ) has recognised that it is not necessary that companies implicated in the alleged cartel activity be based inside the EU; nor is it necessary for the restrictive agreement to be entered into inside the EU, or the alleged acts to be committed or business conducted within the EU. In *Wood Pulp I*, the ECJ found that the decisive factor in determining whether the EU competition rules apply is where the agreement, decision or concerted practice is implemented.12 Overall, according to the effects doctrine, the application of competition rules pertaining to cartels is justified under public international law whenever it is foreseeable that the relevant anti-competitive agreement or conduct will have an immediate and substantial effect in the EU.

ii Parent company liability

The conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to the parent company where, having regard to the economic, organisational and legal links between those two entities, the subsidiary does not decide independently upon its own conduct on the market but carries out in all material respects the instructions given to it by the parent company. In such a situation, the parent and subsidiary form a single undertaking for the purposes of EU competition law. The Commission is therefore able to impose fines on a parent company without first having to establish its involvement in the infringement. Where a parent company has a 100 per cent shareholding in a subsidiary, there is a rebuttable presumption that the parent company exercises a decisive influence over its subsidiary, and therefore the two entities form a single undertaking. Shareholdings below 100 per cent may also give rise to a position of a single undertaking depending on the level of the shareholding and the nature of the links between the companies.13 In September 2013, the ECJ confirmed that parent companies may be held liable for infringements of the European competition rules committed by their full function joint ventures.14

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11 Joaquín Almunia, Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Competition Policy: ‘The evolutionary pressure of globalization on competition control’, 24 April 2013.
iii Affirmative defences and exemptions

Article 101(3) exempts those agreements that, although restrictive of competition, have pro-competitive effects outweighing the competition concerns. However, it is highly unlikely that a hard-core cartel agreement could qualify for such an exemption. Commissioner Almunia has noted that ‘cartel control is different from the other areas of competition policy. The question is not whether cartels should be allowed; nobody would be in favour of this option. Our only task here is finding the best way to fight them.’

There are no industry-specific defences. There are, however, special rules governing the application of Article 101 of the TFEU to the agricultural and transport sectors.

IV LENIENCY PROGRAMMES

i Overview of the leniency programme

In December 2006, the Commission adopted the Leniency Notice, which built on its experience with its previous leniency programmes. The Leniency Notice is essentially based on two principles: first, that the earlier undertakings contact the Commission, the higher the reward; second, that the value of the reward will depend on the usefulness of the materials supplied.

ii Immunity

Full immunity from fines that might otherwise be imposed by the Commission will be granted under the Leniency Notice to either:

a. the first undertaking to provide the Commission with information and evidence to enable the Commission to carry out a targeted inspection in connection with the alleged cartel; or

b. the first undertaking to submit information and evidence enabling the Commission to find an infringement of Article 101 of the TFEU.

These options are mutually exclusive, so only one undertaking can qualify for full immunity.

The undertaking seeking immunity must provide the Commission with a corporate statement and other evidence relating to the alleged cartel, in particular, any evidence contemporaneous with the infringement. Corporate statements may take the form of written documents signed by or on behalf of the undertaking or may be made orally. They should include:

a. a detailed description of the cartel arrangement;

b. contact details of the applicant and the other members of the cartel;


16 The Commission notice entitled ‘Delivering oral statements at the DG Competition’, 8 October 2013, provides practical guidance on the content and delivery of oral corporate statements in cartel cases.
the names, positions and addresses of all individuals involved in the cartel; and

information on which other competition authorities have been (or are intended to be) approached in relation to the cartel.

To obtain full immunity, an undertaking must also fulfil the following conditions:

a  it must cooperate fully and expeditiously, on a continual basis with the Commission (see further details below);

b  it must put an end to its involvement in the cartel immediately following its application (except where in the Commission’s view it would be reasonably necessary to preserve the integrity of the inspections);

c  it cannot have destroyed, falsified or concealed evidence of the cartel or disclosed the leniency application (except to other competition authorities); and

d  it cannot have taken steps to coerce other undertakings to participate in the cartel.

Assuming all the relevant conditions are satisfied at the time of application, the Commission should grant conditional immunity to the undertaking. If it then continues to comply with its obligations, the conditional immunity should be confirmed in the final decision.

iii Reduction in fine

If an undertaking does not qualify for immunity, favourable treatment is also available under the Leniency Notice if it provides evidence representing significant added value to that already in the Commission’s possession and terminates its involvement in the cartel activity. Provided these conditions are met, the cooperating undertaking may receive up to a 50 per cent reduction in the level of fine that would have been imposed had it not cooperated. The envisaged reductions are split into three bands:

a  30 to 50 per cent for the first undertaking to provide significant added value;

b  20 to 30 per cent for the second undertaking to provide significant added value; and

c  zero to 20 per cent for any subsequent undertakings to provide significant added value.

The amount received within these bands depends upon the time at which the undertaking started to cooperate, the quality of evidence provided and the extent to which it represents added value. If a leniency applicant supplies information previously unknown to the Commission showing that the cartel had lasted longer or was in some way more serious than the Commission had been aware, the Commission will not take account of those elements (regarding duration or gravity) when setting the level of that applicant’s fine.

Undertakings wishing to benefit from a reduction in their fine should provide the Commission with their evidence of the cartel activity at issue. Following the necessary verification process by the Commission, they will be informed whether the evidence submitted at the time of their application has passed the significant added value threshold (as well as the specific band within which any reduction will be determined) at the latest on the day of adoption of a statement of objections. The specific reduction to be granted should be confirmed in the final decision.
iv Markers
To take advantage of the Commission’s leniency programme, an undertaking (or its legal advisers) must contact DG Competition. If immunity is still available for the particular cartel in question, the undertaking may either initially apply for a marker or immediately proceed to make a formal application to the Commission for immunity from fines.

The Commission may grant a marker protecting an immunity applicant’s place in the queue to allow for the gathering of the necessary information and evidence. To be eligible to secure a marker, the applicant must provide the Commission with information concerning:

a its name and address;
b the parties to the alleged cartel;
c the affected products and territories;
d the estimated duration of the alleged cartel;
e the nature of the alleged cartel conduct;
f details of any other past or possible future leniency applications to other authorities in relation to the alleged cartel; and
g its justification for requesting a marker.

Where the Commission grants a marker, it will specify the time period in which the applicant must perfect the marker by submitting information and evidence required to meet the relevant threshold for immunity.

v Duties of cooperation
A leniency applicant must maintain complete and continuous cooperation throughout the Commission’s investigation. The Leniency Notice explains that this includes:

a promptly providing the Commission with all relevant information and evidence relating to the alleged cartel that comes into its possession or is available to it;
b remaining at the Commission’s disposal to promptly answer any request that may contribute to the establishment of the facts;
c making current (and, if possible, former) employees and directors available for interviews with the Commission;
d not destroying, falsifying or concealing relevant information or evidence relating to the alleged cartel; and

e not disclosing the fact or any of the content of its application before the Commission has issued a statement of objections in the case, unless otherwise agreed.

vi Access of private litigants to leniency materials
Information and documents communicated to the Commission under the Leniency Notice are treated as confidential. Any subsequent disclosure to the parties under investigation, as may be required by the proceedings, will be made in accordance with the
rules relating to access to the file. In practice, the Commission does not publicly reveal the identity of a leniency applicant as long as the investigations continue. Eventually, however, details of the cartel investigation and the applicant’s involvement may be made publicly available in the final Commission decision and the associated press release issued by the Commission.

The Commission has, in the past, sought to limit the production of confidential documents (including corporate statements made by parties under the Leniency Notice) in private litigation proceedings. For example, the Director General of the Commission’s competition department, Alexander Italianer, wrote to a court in New York to advise a judge not to allow the disclosure of a confidential version of the Commission’s infringement decision issued in its Air Cargo cartel investigation in civil damages proceedings brought before the New York court, emphasising that ‘the Commission's long-established policy is that the corporate statements specifically prepared for submission under the [Commission’s] leniency programme are given protection against disclosure both during and after its investigation’.

In June 2011, the ECJ provided guidance in the Pfleiderer case regarding when private litigants may obtain discovery of materials surrendered as part of a leniency programme. The ECJ noted that EU law does not automatically preclude the disclosure of a leniency applicant’s submission in subsequent court proceedings where such disclosure is required by national law. However, rather than adopting a definitive line, the ECJ concluded that it was for each national court to determine on a case-by-case basis the response to be applied to such requests, balancing concerns over disclosure undermining the effectiveness of leniency regimes against the need to ensure that it is not unduly difficult for parties to bring damages actions to recover losses arising from competition law violations.

In June 2013, following a reference from the Austrian Cartel Court for a preliminary ruling, the ECJ further clarified that EU law precludes national legislation that prevents potential claimants from accessing court files absent the consent of the

17 Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004.
18 Case 1:06-md-01775-JG-VVP, In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation. Notwithstanding this position, the Commission has argued in interim relief hearings that the Leniency Notice does not give outright protection to leniency documents for the private interest of the undertakings applying for leniency. In the context of defending an action seeking to prevent the publication of certain details in a cartel infringement decision, the Commission argued that the undertakings applying for leniency should not be placed in a better position than other participants in the cartel by keeping part of their offending conduct secret, given that that secrecy also unduly disadvantages third parties harmed by the cartel who have a legitimate interest in seeking compensation. Akzo Nobel and others v. European Commission, Order of the President of The General Court, 16 November 2012.
parties to the competition proceedings. The ECJ objected to such national legislation on the basis that it does not leave any possibility for the national court to weigh up the interests involved.

Following the decision in *Pfleiderer*, Commissioner Almunia called for EU legislation to be passed to protect the Commission's leniency programmes, while also ensuring an effective right to damages for private litigants. In June 2013, the Commission published a proposal for a directive on rules governing private actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules (see Section VIII, *infra*). The proposal sets out a number of safeguards in relation to leniency programmes, including absolute protection from disclosure or use as evidence for leniency corporate statements and settlement submissions, and temporary protection for documents specifically prepared in the context of the public enforcement proceedings by the parties (e.g., replies to authorities’ requests for information) or the competition authorities (e.g., a statement of objections).

Potential leniency applicants and litigants should also have regard to the transparency rules contained in EU Regulation 1049/2001, which gives EU citizens and companies a right of access to documents drawn up by, or in the possession of, EU institutions. In 2012, the EU General Court overturned a Commission decision denying a German energy distributor (EnBW) access to leniency documents that had been applied for under Regulation 1049/2001. The Commission issued a blanket refusal in response to EnBW’s request for access on the basis that a number of the documents on file contained business-sensitive information and it could not conduct a more detailed review of each individual document. The General Court upheld EnBW’s appeal against this decision, and the matter is now before the ECJ following an appeal by the Commission against the lower court’s judgment. Although judgment from the ECJ is still awaited, the Advocate General has issued an opinion upholding several grounds of the Commission’s appeal, in particular that a general presumption exists that disclosure of such documents is likely to undermine the general interest that cartel proceedings seek to protect. The ECJ’s judgment should therefore provide further guidance as to how Regulation 1049/2001 should be applied in cartel cases.

vii Potential issues arising from simultaneous representation by counsel of the corporate entity and its employees

As individuals cannot be penalised for breach of the TFEU competition rules, it may be possible for external counsel to represent a corporate entity while also advising the employees that have participated in the cartel (provided that this is compatible with the law firm’s own professional conduct obligations). However, such an arrangement could
give rise to issues in respect of criminal proceedings against individuals under national legislation where conflicts of interest between the corporate entity and the employees may arise. Conflicts of interest may also arise in respect of disciplinary measures imposed upon employees pursuant to their contract of employment. A decision on the appropriateness of such arrangements will therefore need to be made on a case-by-case basis.

V PENALTIES

i Overview

The principal sanction available to the Commission is the imposition of fines on the undertakings that have engaged in cartel activities. The Commission does not have any powers to impose criminal sanctions on individuals involved (in contrast to the position at the national level in some countries).

Regulation 1/2003 provides that fines can be imposed for a breach of Article 101 of the TFEU up to a maximum of 10 per cent of worldwide turnover of the undertaking in the financial year preceding the decision. The ECJ has confirmed that the Commission has wide discretion in setting the level of fines on companies within these limits. The Commission has at various times reaffirmed its commitment to detecting and punishing hard-core cartels, increasing the number and intensity of its investigations, and imposing record fines. The highest fines imposed by the Commission in respect of cartel cases include:

a In November 2008, the Commission imposed total fines of €1.38 billion upon four undertakings in respect of a Car Glass cartel. The highest individual fine was that imposed upon Saint Gobain at €896 million.

b In December 2012, total fines of €1.47 billion on seven undertakings for participation in two cartels relating to cathode ray tubes.

c In December 2013, the Commission imposed total fines of €1.71 billion on eight undertakings in two cartel decisions relating to euro interest rate derivatives (EIRD) and yen interest rate derivatives (YIRD).

The Commission imposed a record total of €2,869 million in cartel fines in 2010. The substantial fines imposed by the Commission in respect of the Cathode Ray Tubes and EIRD/YIRD cases show that the regulator is determined to continue imposing very high fines in respect of cartels.

ii Factors taken into account when setting the penalty

A financial penalty imposed by the Commission in respect of a cartel will be calculated following the methodology set out in its Fining Guidelines. This methodology may be summarised as follows:

a value of sales—the Commission starts by applying a percentage of the undertaking’s value of sales in the market affected by the infringement. The percentage applied

23 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No. 1/2003.
in each case will be based on the gravity of the infringement and, as a general rule, will be set at a level of up to 30 per cent of sales. In determining the proportion of the value of sales, account is taken of the nature of the infringement, its actual impact on the market and the size of the relevant geographic market;

\( b \) duration – the amount determined based on the value of sales will be multiplied by the number of years of participation in the infringement. Periods of less than six months will be counted as half a year, and periods of longer than six months but shorter than one year will be counted as a full year;

\( c \) entry fee – an additional sum of between 15 per cent and 25 per cent of the value of sales is included to deter undertakings from participating in cartels even for only a short period;

\( d \) aggravating or attenuating circumstances and other adjustments – the sum achieved from the value of sales multiplied by the duration, plus the entry fee, is adjusted to reflect a variety of possible aggravating or attenuating circumstances. The Fining Guidelines place an emphasis on recidivism as an aggravating factor: the Commission may increase a fine by up to 100 per cent for each similar infringement found by the Commission or by an NCA. Additional adjustments are possible on the basis of other objective factors, such as the specific economic context, any economic or financial benefit derived by the offenders, the specific characteristics of the companies in question and their real ability to pay in a specific social context; and

\( e \) adjustment for leniency or settlement discounts.

Given the substantial discretion the Commission has in setting fines, it can in practice be difficult to assess with certainty the ultimate penalty that will be imposed in cartel cases. This is largely justified on public policy grounds, as increased transparency could prompt companies to engage in offsetting calculations between the likely level of fines and the likely benefit arising from the anti-competitive cartel conduct. Nonetheless, the Commission generally follows the Fining Guidelines and must exercise its discretion in a coherent and non-discriminatory way.

iii Early resolutions and settlement procedures

In June 2008, the Commission introduced a new procedure for settling cartel cases, which is intended to complement the Leniency Notice and the Fining Guidelines. The aim of the settlement procedure is to simplify and speed up the administrative procedure for investigations (and to reduce ECJ litigation in cartel cases), thereby freeing up the Commission's resources and enabling it to pursue more cases.

Pursuant to the settlement procedure, the parties are expected to acknowledge their participation in and liability for the cartel, and reach a common understanding with the Commission about the nature and scope of the illegal activity and the appropriate penalty. In return for such cooperation, the parties are rewarded with a 10 per cent reduction in fines (cumulative to any leniency reduction) and a cap on the multiplier that may be applied to the fine for specific deterrence (to a multiple of two).

The Commission has a broad margin of discretion to determine which cases may be suitable for settlement. An undertaking does not have the right to enter into settlement
discussions, but nor is it under an obligation to do so if invited by the Commission. The procedure is available in cases where the Commission has initiated proceedings with a view to adopting an infringement decision and imposing fines but has not yet issued a formal statement of objections. Settlements may, however, be explored at an earlier stage if requested by the undertakings under investigation.

The Commission has used the settlement procedure in respect of nine cartel decisions to date. Recent examples include the Commission’s cartel decisions in respect of CRT Glass (2011), Water Management Products (2012), Automotive Wire Harnesses (2013) and EIRD/YIRD (2013). The Commission has shown willingness to pursue ‘hybrid’ cases where one or more parties elects not to settle. This was the case in Animal Feed Phosphates (2010) and EIRD/YIRD (2013).

VI ‘DAY ONE’ RESPONSE

Officials from the European Commission may carry out unannounced inspections anywhere in the EU in order to investigate possible cartel activities. The team conducting a dawn raid usually consists of between five and 10 officials. The Commission officials are normally accompanied by two or three officials from the relevant NCAs assisting the Commission in its investigation. The Commission officials will often be willing to wait for a short period for an undertaking to consult its legal advisers before commencing the inspection. Any such delay must, however, be kept to a minimum. The General Court recently upheld a Commission decision to increase a fine on an undertaking under investigation partly on the basis that officials were refused access to the premises pending the arrival of external lawyers.24

When carrying out a surprise inspection visit, the officials may:

- enter the premises, land and means of transport of undertakings or an association of undertakings;
- examine the books and other business records of the company under investigation (irrespective of how they are stored);
- take copies of books and records;
- require on-the-spot oral explanations of facts or documents relating to the subject matter and purpose of the inspection; and
- seal any business premises and books or records for the time necessary for the inspection.

The European Commission issued a new explanatory note in March 2013, which provides further details on the extent to which officials will use IT procedures to carry out an inspection.25 In particular, the note explains that officials can search an undertaking’s IT environment and storage media using both built-in search tools

and their own forensic IT tools. The Commission may also remove copies of data for searching at a later date. Undertakings must cooperate with the inspection and may be required to provide assistance, not only for explanations on the organisation and its IT environment, but also for specific tasks such as the temporary blocking of individual e-mail accounts, temporarily disconnecting running computers from the network, removing and re-installing hard drives from computers and providing ‘administrator access rights’ support. When such actions are taken, the undertaking under inspection must ensure that employees do not interfere in any way with these measures.

The Commission may also – subject to obtaining a court warrant – inspect private premises, land and means of transportation, including the homes of directors, managers and other members of staff of the undertaking concerned, if there is reasonable suspicion that books and other records related to the business and to the subject matter of the inspection are located there.

The Commission can impose penalties of up to 1 per cent of the total turnover upon any undertaking that obstructs an inspection. For example, in 2008, the Commission imposed a fine of €38 million on E.ON Energie for the breach of a Commission seal in E.ON’s premises during an inspection. The fine was upheld by the ECJ on appeal in November 2012.

It is therefore essential to develop a coordinated strategy for dealing with an inspection. Important issues to consider include:

a. arranging for each official to be assisted or shadowed by a member of staff or lawyer, and for the provision of appropriate IT support to allow the officials to conduct their inspection;

b. briefing relevant employees that they should not obstruct the investigation (e.g., by destroying or deleting records or by interfering with IT measures) while also noting that anything they say to the officials may be recorded as evidence;

c. establishing a process for identifying documents that may be covered by legal privilege before officials are allowed to see or copy them;

d. maintaining a record of what officials ask for and inspect, and keeping copies of documents copied by the officials; and

e. ensuring that the fact that the inspection is taking place is not leaked outside the company.

In addition to carrying out unannounced inspections, the Commission may issue information requests under Article 18 of Regulation No. 1/2003 as a means of obtaining information from undertakings based in the EU. The Commission can impose fines upon EU undertakings of up to 1 per cent of total turnover for supplying incorrect or misleading information in response to an information request. With respect to non-EU undertakings, the Commission is often able to exercise its jurisdiction by sending the information request within the EU to a subsidiary company that belongs to the non-EU parent group. However, where a firm has no physical presence in the EU, this will not be possible. In such case, the Commission usually sends out informal information requests; it is normal for addressees to cooperate in the provision of information in response to such requests.

In light of the significant penalties that may be imposed for a breach of Article 101 of the TFEU, a tailored strategy should be developed to deal with the fallout from an
unannounced inspection or receipt of information covering alleged cartel activities. Active consideration should be given to whether it is appropriate to be making applications for leniency. The strategy should be developed with senior management and the legal department in view of the surrounding facts and the different issues and risks raised in all potentially relevant jurisdictions. Delay in the implementation of a strategy could have serious consequences (e.g., in terms of the priority of leniency applications), as could the implementation of a policy that does not take due account of identifiable risks (in terms of potential civil actions, follow-on investigations in other jurisdictions, etc.).

VII PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT

Third parties who have suffered loss as a result of cartel behaviour in breach of Article 101 of the TFEU can sue for damages before the national courts. The precise rules of standing, procedure and quantification of damages vary between different EU Member States. Overall, there are still notable impediments to pursuing such damages claims in Europe, but the Commission and a number of Member States are attempting to address some of these issues (see Section VIII, infra).

VIII CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

In June 2013, the European Commission published a proposal for a directive on rules governing private damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules (the Proposed Directive). The Proposed Directive's main objective is to ensure the effective enforcement of the EU antitrust rules by optimising the interaction between the public and private enforcement of these rules, and improving the conditions under which compensation can be obtained for harm caused by infringements of the rules.

The Proposed Directive contains a number of proposed measures aimed at facilitating damages actions, most notably:

\( a \) allowing national courts to order parties to the proceedings and third parties to disclose evidence when victims claim compensation;

\( b \) ensuring national courts cannot take decisions that run counter to final infringement decisions by national competition authorities;

\( c \) introducing limitation periods that provide victims with a reasonable opportunity to bring a damages action;

\( d \) recognising the possibility for defendants to invoke the passing on defence;

\( e \) facilitating consensual settlements to allow a faster and less costly resolution of compensation disputes; and

\( f \) providing a rebuttable presumption that a cartel infringement has caused harm.

To ensure that facilitating damages actions does not diminish the incentives for companies to cooperate with competition authorities, the Proposed Directive also sets out a number of safeguards, including absolute protection from disclosure or use as evidence for leniency corporate statements and settlement submissions, and temporary protection for documents specifically prepared in the context of the public enforcement proceedings by the parties or the competition authorities.
At the time of writing, the Proposed Directive is currently undergoing scrutiny by the Council and the European Parliament. Assuming the Proposed Directive is adopted, Member States will have two years to transpose the Directive into national law.

The European Commission has also published a recommendation that Member States put in place national collective redress mechanisms where EU law grants rights to citizens and companies, notably consumer protection, competition, environmental protection and financial services. Member States have two years to put in place appropriate measures in response to the recommendation. The Commission will then assess the state of play and examine whether any legislative measures should be proposed in this area.
Appendix 1

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